











the  controversial  relationship  between Western donors and  the power  they have over  their  recipient governments. While 
these debates were once politically germane, recent trends show a decline of donor funding, as well as an increase of financial 
ownership of the epidemic within Southern Africa. Commensurate with this shifting financial influence, some well‐governed, 
wealthy  African  states  are  beginning  to  deviate  from  global  M&E  (monitoring  and  evaluation)  indicators.  These  policy 





In 2007, UNAIDS (the United Nations Joint 
Programme on HIV/AIDS) issued a statement that 
global HIV/AIDS incidence had likely reached a peak 
in the late 1990s, and was now on the decline 
(UNAIDS and WHO 2007). In other words, the worst 
had come and gone, in terms of the number of new 
infections. After a decade of surging external finance, 
international assistance for AIDS decreased. It was 
difficult to pinpoint when this shift began to take place, 
but financial data suggested that donor priorities 
began to shift in the following year, around 2008. 
While a multitude of factors were likely at play, 
including the global financial crisis and a change of 
leadership in the US, it was clear that around this time, 
things began to change. International funding for HIV 
fell by approximately 10 percent in 2010, when 
compared with 2009 funding levels (Kates et al. 2011). 
The drop of available HIV funding from US$7.6 
billion in 2009 to US$6.9 billion in 2010 represents 
that for the first time funding has decreased in more 
than a decade.  To put this shift in perspective, 
HIV/AIDS funding was six times higher in 2008 than 
in 2002, before it flat-lined in 2009. UNAIDS and the 
Kaiser Family Foundation attribute this decline in 
HIV funding to reductions in development assistance, 
which they say is primarily as a result of a slower 
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disbursement rate from the donor governments. With 
the exception of Uganda, the US President’s 
Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) has 
reduced its funding for antiretrovirals (ARVs) in 2009 
and 2010 and frozen its overall HIV/AIDS budget for 
2009-2014. Additionally, the International Drug 
Purchase Facility (UNITAID) is ending funding for 
second-line ARVs in Zimbabwe, Mozambique, the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, and Malawi by 2012. 
The most alarming evidence of this recent shift in 
financial commitment to the fight against HIV comes 
from the Global Fund to fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, 
and Malaria. In November 2011, the Fund announced 
the cancellation of its 11th round of grants, due to 
cutbacks in donations from contributing countries. 
This is a substantial culmination of many precipitating 
aid curtailments, which effectively turns off the tap 
from the largest on-budget donor for the majority of 
high-burden countries. It is the prerogative of this 
paper that these funding cuts, predominantly from the 
Global Fund, are related to changing HIV/AIDS 
policy agendas in affected countries. These shifts may 




The dramatic donor retreat since 2007/2008 for 
HIV/AIDS programs has been heavily documented by 
NGOs, international organizations, academics and the 
media (Denny and Emanuel 2008; Wenner 2009; 
Médecins Sans Frontières 2010; Dickinson 2010; 
Kates et al. 2011; PlusNews 2011a; Usher 2011; 
UNAIDS 2012; Zumla 2012). However, these funding 
cuts are just one component of the new global politics 
of HIV/AIDS. There are myriad adjunct 
circumstances, perhaps brought about by changes in 
Western HIV/AIDS funding, which also play an 
integral role in the shifting terrain of HIV/AIDS 
policy and programs in Southern Africa.  
Commensurate with the global donor retreat in 
HIV/AIDS is an upswing in domestic funding in 
African countries (see Figure 1). When the 
international community has been quick to sound the 
alarm with respect to declining Western funding, there 
has been very little public attention paid to the 
considerable financial ownership of HIV/AIDS in the 
Global South. In total, African domestic spending 
(defined as public spending independent of Global 
Fund aid, bilateral aid, or multilateral aid) on 
HIV/AIDS efforts in affected countries rose from 
US$500 million in 2000 to US$2.5 billion in 2004 and 
US$4.3 billion in 2008 (Bonnel 2009). Lesotho was a 
prime example, where domestic funding for 
HIV/AIDS programs (as a percentage of total AIDS 
funding in the country) increased from 18.7 percent in 
2006-2007, to 37.2 percent in 2007-2008 and 56.9 
percent in 2008-2009 (National AIDS Commission of 
Lesotho 2008). Similar upward trends were evident in 
Zimbabwe, where domestic funding leapt from 16.4 
percent in 2005 to 49.0 percent in 2006. More recently, 
Kenya’s 2010/2011 national budget has—for the first 
time ever—allocated money for local ARV programs 
(PlusNews 2010a). While the dollar amount coming 
out of these countries by no means completely 
mitigates the global funding shortfall, these changes 
may significantly restructure the politics of the disease 
management.  
It is not just increasing financial ownership from 
Southern Africa that is on the rise. Research efforts 
toward HIV/AIDS are also increasing, demonstrating 
a larger scientific emphasis than before. In the US, 
research on HIV/AIDS has begun to level off, while 
South African research output on the subject is going 
up. By comparison, the US (the largest producer of 
HIV/AIDS study) is dedicating about 2 percent of its 
total research efforts to HIV/AIDS, whereas 5.5 
percent of South Africa’s research output is on 
HIV/AIDS (Campbell 2010).   
The onus on African governments to step in and 








base is clear. Writing on South Africa, Bodibe (2010) 
noted how donor-assisted countries were essentially 
forced to finance HIV/AIDS programs from their own 
public coffers. His notions of a domestically-funded 
imperative seem to be confirmed. In 2010, South 
Africa approved an increase of ZAR 8.4 billion (about 
US$1 billion) in the national budget for ARVs 
(Odendal 2010), which should add an extra 100,000 
people to treatment regimes (Langa 2010). Along with 
this, there was an additional ZAR 100 million (about 
US$12 million) in the Medium Term Expenditure 
Framework for HIV prevention in 2010, which 
formed part of a larger commitment from the South 
African government, of ZAR 1.5 billion (about 
US$18.5 million) for HIV programs from 2010 to 
2013. Additionally, in the wake of Swaziland’s 
funding crisis which resulted from Global Fund 
rejection of its Round 10 application, South Africa 
stepped in to support the Swazi government with a 
US$313 million loan, the first US$104 million 
infusion to go directly to health and education 
(PlusNews 2011b). This loan represented substantial 
financial ownership of the HIV epidemic coming from 
Southern Africa, especially when compared to 
PEPFAR’s US$7 million emergency funding for 
Swaziland, which was only to go toward first-line 
ARVs.  
Rwanda has also been increasing its financial 
contributions to global HIV/AIDS efforts, by pledging 
US$ 1 million to the Global Fund in 2010 (The New 
Times 2010). The donation came from the Rwandan 
financial institution—Access Bank, demonstrating the 
mounting commitment of the African private sector in 
filling the financial chasm left by Western donor 
retreat. Youde (2010) suggested aid for HIV and 
domestic health spending’s rise and fall together. He 
said that when foreign aid rose, this freed up public 
resources to be spent on other health care needs. By 
the same logic, if foreign aid falls, public money in 





Along with South Africa and Rwanda, Tanzania 
has also been increasing its domestic spending on 
HIV/AIDS. In December 2010, Vice President Dr. 
Mohammed Gharib Bilali announced that Mbeya, 
Iringa and Dar es Salam regions (those with 
prevalence rates of 5 percent or higher) would be 
allocated more money from the federal government, 
though the Medium Term Expenditure Framework 
(MTEF), for HIV programming (Lucas 2010).  
In addition to increased African financial 
commitments for HIV/AID programs, there is also a 
movement toward locally producing ARV 
pharmaceuticals, another form of HIV/AIDS domestic 
investment. In Uganda, Quality Chemical Industries 
has partnered with Indian generic drug manufacturer, 
Cipla, to locally produce ARVs. Carel IJsselmuiden, 
director of the Council on Health Research for 
Development (COHRED), noted how African 
countries were increasingly electing to take charge of 
their own public health situation, and McColl (2010) 
indicated that local pharmaceutical production was an 
example of the momentum behind Africans 
increasingly driving the HIV/AIDS agenda. Similarly, 
Tanzania’s first locally manufactured ARVs will 
begin to be produced midway through 2012, at the 
country’s new pharmaceutical plant in Arusha. While 
the plant is built using a grant from the European 
Union of about US$6.6 million, it is significant that 
the Tanzania Pharmaceuticals Industry (40 percent 
government owned) has contributed US$963,000 to 
the project (PlusNews 2012). A similar investment is 
occurring in South Africa, where the government is 
investing ZAR 1 billion to build a pharmaceuticals 
plant, which will locally produce ARV ingredients by 
2016 (Aboobaker 2012). 
Another element of the new global politics of 
HIV/AIDS is a movement in the political and 
rhetorical approach to HIV/AIDS strategy. Since 2010, 
there has been political impetus for global donors to 
re-allocate their efforts away from AIDS treatment, 
toward more cost-effective health interventions such 
as childhood immunization, malaria, tuberculosis, 
maternal mortality, and family planning. The World 
Bank has already begun to move in this direction. In 
its evaluation of its programs for the previous year, 
the Bank notes that the earlier emphasis on HIV/AIDS 
may have distorted the rest of the health care system. 
It also found that its portfolio performance for 
HIV/AIDS has performed much lower than that of 
other health, population and nutrition projects. 
Furthermore, the US government is also harmonizing 
their foreign public health policies with 
recommendations like these. The Obama 
Administration’s Global Health Initiative, which has 
subsumed PEPFAR, now shifts the focus from 
HIV/AIDS to the abovementioned, as well as child 
health, nutrition, reproductive health, and neglected 
tropical diseases.  
The point here is that a dramatic modification is 
witnessed in the political terrain of HIV/AIDS. Along 
with the immense impact of the global donor retreat, 
the politics of HIV/AIDS is being reshaped by the 
increased domestic financial contributions toward 
HIV/AIDS from the affected countries and a rhetorical 
movement in Western discourses on public health. 
The rationale behind this paper is that this global shift 
necessitates a re-interrogation into who governs public 
health. Conventional wisdom suggests that policy 
pressure from global institutions and donors dictate 
HIV/AIDS policy and programming in the Global 
South, and that these imported strategies are less 
effective than locally devised interventions (Epstein 
2007; Pisani 2008; Timberg and Halperin 2012). 
However, given the recent financial and political 
donor retreat detailed above, this line of thinking 
might be less relevant today than it was a decade ago. 
More importantly, in 2010, for the first time ever, 
global HIV/AIDS incidence began declining. If there 
is a change in policy making as a result of the new 
global politics of HIV/AIDS, it might help explain 




evidence toward the debate about whether local or 
international HIV/AIDS policies are more effective.  
THEORETICAL MODEL: DAHL’S 
PLURALISM   
This project is expected to find that the HIV/AIDS 
policies of global institutions exerted less influence 
over Southern African national strategic plans (NSPs) 
than the previous case, which was a postulation based 
on pluralist political theory. Where the question asked 
in this paper is borrowed from Robert Dahl (who 
governs?), so too is the reasoning of the hypothesis.  
Traditionally, pluralism suggests that political 
power and decision-making processes reside within 
the framework of governments, but the myriad 
non-governmental “interest groups” may also exert 
influence (Dahl 1961). For Dahl, this was a way of 
conceptualizing political power sharing in what he 
called “spheres of influence” (Dahl 1961: 190). The 
pivotal question for classical pluralism, Dahl, and this 
project, is how influence is distributed between 
governments and these interest groups. Conflicting 
interests are many, as demonstrated in the background 
section of this paper. Additionally, these interests are 
fluid, as shifts in priorities of vested parties are 
continuous.  
Dahl’s distinction between actual and potential 
influence also colours how this project theorizes the 
descriptive part of its hypothesis that the HIV 
policy-making power of global institutions is 
decreasing. It is not so much that global players do not 
have the potential to exercise previous levels of 
influence, but rather that since they have now chosen 
to use their resources in different ways, their actual 
level of influence may have changed. More clearly, 
since global institutions are reallocation funds and 
political emphasis away from HIV/AIDS and toward 
other public health interventions (such as child 
immunization and mosquito nets), patterns of 
influence change and the power of national 
governments in domestic policy making is predicted 
to increase.  
Furthermore, Dahl’s emphasis on variation of 
influence among different actors forms the basis for 
this paper’s explanatory logic that there will 
necessarily be divergence from global policy to a 
varying degree, depending on other variables 
(resources, state effectiveness, etc.). Dahl remarked 
how this variation in power-sharing arrangements was 




The objectives of this research are threefold: First, it 
measures the degree to which Southern African 
HIV/AIDS NSPs comply with international policy 
language; second, it draws out variables, such as 
wealth and governance, which might help explain 
what makes a country more likely to comply with 
international policy; and third, the paper investigates 
whether changes in policy and epidemiological 
outcomes might correlate in a way that could 
contribute to the debate about whether local or 
international HIV/AIDS policies are more efficacious.  
In order to measure this, a system of international 
HIV/AIDS indicators was adapted from the Global 
Fund’s 2009 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) 
Toolkit for HIV. The Global Fund was selected as the 
independent variable since it represented the largest 
direct-government donor in most Southern African 
countries. For instance, in Malawi, the Global Fund 
makes up 54.4 percent of total HIV/AIDS funding, 
and in Swaziland 31 percent of external funding 
comes from them (UNAIDS 2008). The government 
of Namibia also points to the Global Fund as their 
largest donor, as does South Africa.  
The Global Fund M&E Toolkit contains 54 
indicators, with a range of different measurements on 




between tuberculosis (TB) and HIV, supportive 
environments, impacts, and outcomes. Of these 54 
indicators, many are strictly epidemiological, such as 
Global Fund Indicator HIV-I1 “Young women and 
men aged 15-24 who are HIV infected (percentage) 
(HIV-I1)” (Global Fund 2009: 75). These were 
excluded from the use in this study, because these 
indicators do not tell anything about policy 
compliance or divergence, only about epidemiological 
realities. That is to say, other outcome indicators were 
included, since they related to a specific focus on 
particular interventions. For instance, Indicator 
HIV-O3, “Women and men aged 15-49 years who 
have had sexual intercourse with more than one 
partner in the last 12 months (percentage)” (Global 
Fund 2009: 75) was included, because adherence to 
this suggested policy focus on multiple concurrent 
partnerships. After careful review of the 54 indicators, 
34 were selected for inclusion in this project’s 
framework. Therefore, the operationalization of the 
term “global policy” was narrowed down to mean 34 
specific indicators from the Global Fund’s 2009 M&E 
Toolkit. Many of the Global Fund’s indicators are 
borrowed from UNAIDS Core National Indicators, 
while others are based on the World Health 
Organization (WHO) or PEPFAR M&E systems. 
Based on this framework, countries’ NSPs for 
HIV/AIDS are then measured against these indicators. 
Using a rigid nominal scale from 0 (where the Global 
Fund M&E indicator is not included in the NSPs at all) 
to 4 (where the Global Fund M&E indicators is 
detailed very precisely), Global Fund M&E indicator 
influence is measured. These values are applied based 
on a structured system of requirements of what 
constitutes each number. For instance, for an indicator 
to receive a value of 4, it must state the Global Fund 
M&E indicator language fairly exactly, include the 
age bracket (if required), and present data to support 
the policy. There are minor exceptions to this, where 
indicators are discussed at length in the policy’s text, 
without data, but still qualify for a scoring of 4 based 
on the narrative emphasis. The author performed this 
method for each of the 34 indicators, across three 
national policies for each country in the study, to 
measure change in policy compliance over time.  
The data was collected from NSPs, sourced online 
or through the National AIDS Councils. It was 
single-coded by the author at the University of Cape 
Town, then repeated six months later and reconciled. 
Some data sets were double-coded by an academic 
peer for a validity check. The logic is that a shift has 
been experienced in the policy making since 2008 
(since global donor funding for HIV/AIDS levelled 
off and began to decline). In order to observe this, it 
was necessary to look at two NSPs before 2008 
—“time one” (T1) and “time two” (T2), and one after 
2008—“time three” (T3). This was necessary because 
in order to confirm the hypothesis that policy 
influence changed since 2008, there needed the 
evidence that there was a directional shift. In other 
words, if a country has been moving away from 
Global Fund M&E indicators since 1993, it would be 
misguided to suggest that the new global politics of 
HIV/AIDS post-2008 were part of that process. On the 
other hand, if a country was moving toward Global 
Fund M&E indicators until 2008 (from T1 to T2), and 
then moved away after 2008 it would more stoutly 
confirm the hypothesis of a changing policy-making 
environment.  
This method was carried out for Anglophone 
countries (since the author is not proficient in 
Portuguese) with HIV prevalence rates higher than 10 
percent, the results of which are expressed as an 
aggregate score (the averages of all 34 indicators) out 
of 4 (see Table 1). For example, before 2008, 
Botswana’s NSP for HIV/AIDS complied with Global 
Fund M&E indicators at a score of 2.588/4, whereas 
after 2008 its NSP only scored 1.676/4. Higher 
numbers in Table 1 represent greater compliance with 
Global Fund indicators.  
In addition, 50 face-to-face interviews were 









Botswana  1.412  2.588  1.676 
South Africa  1.059  3.118  2.353 
Zambia  1.588  2.441  2.529 
Zimbabwe    1.353  2.206  2.618 
Swaziland    1.059  2.235  2.765 
Lesotho  1.265  2.147  3.088 
Malawi  1.265  1.912  3.118 
Namibia    1.382  2.147  3.382 
 
Botswana, Malawi, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. 
Informants were selected based on membership of the 
Country Coordinating Mechanisms (CCMs) in each 
country. The CCMs are an in-country board which is 
responsible for designing country’s proposals to the 
Global Fund, and for overseeing the implementation 
of Global Fund grants. These interviews were 
conducted to help inform the findings of the 
quantitative policy analysis, assisting in the 
explanation of why certain policy changes may have 
occurred. Ethics clearance was obtained from each 
respondent by way of a consent form. Further, each 
respondent was given the opportunity to review their 
interview transcript and make changes if they felt they 
were being misrepresented.  
RESULTS 
The data in the Table 1 somewhat disrupt the 
hypothesis that the new global politics of HIV/AIDS 
is leading to a mass movement away from 
international policy norms. In fact, this only seems to 
be true of two countries—Botswana and South Africa. 
All the other English-speaking countries with HIV 
prevalence rates of 10 percent or higher continue to 
closely align their policy language with the language 
of Global Fund M&E indicators.  
A good example of global HIV policy compliance 
gradually increasing over time is Lesotho’s policy on 
sexual abstinence (see Table 2). The NSP for 
2000-2003, which was written in September 2000, 
shows some level of compliance. There is the notion 
of youth, although the age bracket is 10-15 years old, 
not the 15-24 that the Global Fund M&E indicator 
requests. By November 2006, Lesotho’s second NSP 
falls slightly more in line with the global indicator. 
Here, the concept of tracking abstinence before the 
age of 15 enters into the policy language, as do 
preliminary data targets. The revision of this policy in 
April 2009 is then completely aligned with the Global 
Fund M&E indicator on abstinence. Now, the age 
bracket of 15-24 is there, and there is data collected 
and presented to support the policy objective. At T3, 
Lesotho’s policy on abstinence is completely parallel 
to the global indicator recommendation, which is the 
reason why it scores 4 out of 4.  
Although Lesotho’s abstinence policy does match 
up with its overall trend (compliance scores gradually 
increasing from T1 to T3), this is certainly not true of 
every indicator in Lesotho’s NSP, or any other 
country in the study. The scores in Table 1 are 
aggregate scores reflecting the average of 34 different 
indicators.  
It should be mentioned that deviation from Global 
Fund M&E indicators does not necessarily mean that 






Global Fund M&E indicator HIV-O1 (Abstinence):  




National AIDS Strategic Plan 
2000/2001-2003/2004 
T2 
National HIV/AIDS Strategic Plan 
2006-2011 
T3 
National HIV/AIDS Strategic Plan 
2006-2011, Revised April 2009 
Policy language 
Strategic aim of “Rate of delayed 
sexual activities by adolescents (10-
15 years) increased by 30% by March 
2003” (Government of Lesotho 2000: 
18). Additionally, “These high rates of 
HIV infection in young men and 
women call for robust prevention 
measures among the youth before the 
onset of sexual activity” (Government 
of Lesotho 2000: 6-7). 
“Promote formal teaching of HIV 
and AIDS with emphasis on 
abstinence” (Government of 
Lesotho 2006: 51). “To reduce the 
percentage of young men and 
women who commence sexual 
intercourse before the age of 15 to 
15% by 2011 among men and to 
10% by 2011 among women”
(Government of Lesotho 2006: 
52-53). 
“The % of young men and women 
aged 15-24 who commence sexual 
intercourse before the age of 15 
reduced from 27% for men and 
15% for women in 2004 to 15% for
men and 10% for women by 2011”
(Government of Lesotho 2009: 11). 
“Baseline Men = 27% and Women 
= 15%” (Government of Lesotho 
2009: 31).  
Score 2 3 4 
 
Table 3. NSP Language for Botswana’s Youth Awareness Policy 
Global Fund M&E indicator HIV-P1 (BCC Mass Media):  
“Young women and men aged 15-24 who both correctly identify ways of preventing the sexual transmission of HIV and who reject 




Botswana National Policy on 
HIV/AIDS 1993 
T2 
National Strategic Framework for 
HIV/AIDS 2003-2009 
T3 
The Second Botswana National 
Strategic Framework for HIV/AIDS 
2010-2016 
Policy language 
“More than 90% of interviewed 
youths had correct knowledge about 
HIV transmission; between 80 and 
90% correctly stated 2 methods of 
prevention” (Republic of Botswana 
1993: 7) and aims at “the 
development and broadcasting of 
programmes, spots and 
advertisements on various aspects of 
AIDS/STD” (Republic of Botswana 
1993: 2). 
“Percent increase of young people 
aged 15-24 who both correctly 
identify ways of preventing the 
sexual transmission of HIV and 
reject major misconceptions about 
HIV transmission” is 36.3% in 2001 
(Republic of Botswana 2003: 23). 
“Section 8.3 focuses on the Media”
(Republic of Botswana 2003: 
72-73). 
“Proportion of young people aged 
10-24 who correctly identify ways 
of preventing sexual transmission of 
HIV” is 42.1% (for 15-24 year olds) 
(Republic of Botswana 2009: 37). 
Additionally, “Mass media should 
be utilized in a positive manner to 
create and promote awareness on 
HIV and AIDS” (Republic of 
Botswana 2009: 18).   
Score 3 4 3 
 
policy language is subtle. An example of this is 
Botswana’s shift in behavior change communication 
policy from its first HIV Strategic Framework to its 
second one (see Table 3). At T2, the language in the 
strategic plan is almost exactly that of the Global 
Fund’s policy indicator (HIV-P1). At T3, the only 
difference is that the language in Botswana’s Strategic 
Framework shifts the age bracket to begin targeting 
youth with prevention messages at the age of 10, 
rather than the international protocol of 15. While this 
is a minor change, it still represents a departure from 
previous policy objectives, and a departure from the 
global indicator language.   
DISCUSSION: EXPLAINING POLICY 
CHANGE   
Why do nations take such widely different approaches 
to the common problem of HIV/AIDS? In some ways, 
HIV/AIDS might be better observed as a political 
problem than a public health issue. Contributing 




government, civil society, economic strength, 
financial priorities, and more. When these variables 
may help explain HIV policy-making choices, they 
may also assist in efforts to improve them. For 
instance, if it is discovered that countries who invest 
more in healthcare are more inclined to devise unique 
HIV/AIDS policies, and these policies are effective, 
then this precipitating factor can be more heavily 
encouraged. In explaining the above data on HIV 
policy change, three key sets of explanatory variables 
were explored: economic situation, such as overall 
wealth and health spending; effectiveness of states, 
such as level of democracy and corruption indices; 
and epidemiology, such as HIV/AIDS prevalence and 
incidence. To test the relationships between policy 
compliance and explanatory variables, the NSP 
compliance scores at T3 (see Table 1) were correlated 
against the most recently available explanatory 
variable data.   
Economic Situation 
Based on the hypothesis that decreased global funding 
combined with increased African funding for 
HIV/AIDS, it will lead to local policy change, 
mapping the connection between policy change and 
economic indicators is paramount. Since the thinking 
is that money drives policy, it would be intuitive to 
assume that richer countries, which contribute more 
domestic funds toward their own HIV/AIDS programs, 
would be in a better position to direct their national 
HIV policies. As one might expect, the amount of 
money for HIV/AIDS that is sourced domestically (as 
a percentage of the total amount) is a highly relevant 
factor for how well a country adheres to global HIV 
policy recommendations; the more money for HIV 
that comes from the affected country, the less likely 
that country is to follow Global Fund M&E indicators 
(r = -.4098). By the same token, the amount of 
funding that a country receives from the Global Fund 
and UN, as a percentage of their total HIV funding, 
they are more likely to adopt the policy language of 
these institutions (see Figure 2). The correlation 
coefficient of this relationship is r = .5433.  
This is also largely true with indicators such as 
Gross National Income (GNI) per capita, where richer 
countries are more likely to devise locally-informed 
HIV/AIDS policies. In many cases, gaps in data points 
and trends can be just as telling as those that are 
apparent (see Figure 3). In this instance, there are 
many poorer countries that comply relatively strongly 
with Global Fund M&E indicators, a couple richer 
countries that do (although South Africa has moved 
away from this adherence since 2008), and one rich 
country that does not. However, the shaded area in 
Figure 2 represents that there are no poor countries in 
this sample that do not align their NSPs with Global 
Fund M&E indicators, which is a telling trend in itself. 
Perhaps there is a threshold of wealth (> $4,000/GNI 
capita) that a country must reach before it has the 
freedom to choose the design of its public health 
policies, without fear of detrimental retribution from 
overseas donor agencies. 
In contrast to the relationship between policy 
compliance and GNI, Official Development 
Assistance (ODA) is not significantly correlated with 
the degree to which a country follows global HIV 
policy norms. With almost no correlation at all, this 
seems to indicate that general aid does not affect HIV 
policy making, but HIV-specific aid does. The odd 
thing here is that the relationship between Global 
Fund M&E indicator compliance and domestic 
spending priorities seems to be the opposite; general 
health spending correlates much stronger with HIV 
policy-making trends than HIV-specific spending does. 
Put more clearly, while the amount of domestic funds 
that make up a country’s HIV budget correlates 
negatively with policy compliance to a certain degree, 
a country’s health expenditure per capita correlates 
much more strongly (see Figure 4). The correlation 
coefficient for this relationship is r = -.7311. Perhaps 
countries that more heavily prioritize health in general 



















less indicator-based policies, whereas domestic HIV 
spending may not necessarily represent such a 
commitment. If domestic funds for HIV are higher, as 
a percentage of that country’s total, it may just be that 
that country is not regarded favourably by bilateral or 
multilateral donors. Zambia is a slight outlier here, 
with relatively low health expenditure per capita, and 
a relatively low (the lowest, next to Botswana and 
South Africa) level of Global Fund M&E indicator 
compliance.  
As part of this research, key informant interviews 
were conducted in Southern Africa in April-June 2012. 
A key informant from the World Bank in Zambia, 
who was a member of the Global Fund Country 
Coordinating Mechanism, suggested that Zambia has 
never thought that policies had to change as a result of 
funding changes:  
[N]o they do not have to change. We just have to look at 
how do we implement that same, and achieve the same, for 
less. So, that is what we are trying to refocus them on. How 
can they be able to, for example, integrate services, and be 
able to implement the same policy. 
This key informant was also previously with the 
Ministry of Health in Zambia, so her perspectives 
helped to colour the interpretation of the data 
correlation in Figure 3.  
Effectiveness of States 
In the past, others have made connections between 
poor governance and HIV prevalence 
(Menon-Johansson 2005), but not about the missing 
link of policy in the middle. Contrary to these 
previous findings, World Bank governance indicators 
(Government Effectiveness, Voice and Accountability, 
Political Stability, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, 
and Control of Corruption) are not very strongly 
correlated to this paper’s data on HIV policy 
compliance. Voice and Accountability only correlates 









at T3, and political stability only explains policy 
adherence at r = -.1093.  
There is, however, a noteworthy link between how 
well a country complies with global HIV policy 
indicators and their Perceived Corruption Index, as 
defined by Transparency International (see Figure 5). 
This index is designed on a scale of 1-10, with higher 
numbers representing more favourable corruption 
perceptions. The correlation between global HIV 
policy compliance and corruption perceptions is r = 
-.5241, suggesting that countries that are perceived to 
be more corrupt, adhere more rigidly to global HIV 
indicators in their NSPs. There could be a potentially 
logical explanation here. The largest direct- 
government donor for all of the countries in this study 
is either the Global Fund or the UN, which means that 
appeasing these organizations is important for 
sustained funding. The Global Fund in particular has 
been known to have a “zero tolerance” toward 
corruption, cancelling grant rounds after corruption 
scandals in Zimbabwe, Zambia, Uganda, and 
Mauritania. As a result, perhaps countries that are 
aware of their global reputations around corruption in 
the past are more inclined to tailor their HIV NSPs to 
pander to Global Fund M&E objectives.  
A key informant in Zimbabwe gives testimony to 
how financial ownership (see Figure 4) and corruption 
(see Figure 5) are intricately related to how much 
flexibility a country has to exert policy autonomy 
within a Global Fund partnership:  
[T]here are so many issues where we feel we are not 
appropriately being heard. There are times when we would 
feel certain things should happen in one way, and Global 
Fund wants them to happen in another way, but because we 
are recipients, and the fact that we are also not—Zimbabwe 






Figure  6.  The  Change  in  Compliance  of  NSPs  With  Global  Fund  M&E  Indicators  From  pre‐2008  to 
post‐2008 and the Change in HIV Prevalence From 2007 to 2009. Source: UNAIDS (2010).   
 
difficult. So we just aim to achieve that level where we say 
“at one stage we will be able to make the decision” and that 
period will only come when our own contribution towards 
those particular programs is significant. But when our own 
contribution is not very significant, and we are found 
wanting in our own side of the house, it makes it very 
difficult. 
The lack of principal recipient (PR) status that this 
informant mentions means that the Zimbabwean 
government is suspended as a primary recipient of 
Global Fund money as a result of misappropriation of 
funds. All Global Fund money is now channelled 
through the United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP) in Zimbabwe. This speaks to the notion that 
corruption perception is a significant explanatory 
variable in the degree to which countries comply with 
Global Fund M&E indicators in the domestic policies 
and programs.   
Epidemiology 
While variables to do with economic strength or the 
effectiveness of states are more logically understood 
as causal factors in policy making, epidemiology is 
not so clear cut. If there are correlations, there are also 
hurdles of chicken-and-egg logic; are policies created 
in response to epidemics or do epidemics change as a 
result of policy? The correlations between the change 
in global HIV policy alignment and the change in HIV 
prevalence, since 2008 (the theorized point of 
inception of the new global politics of HIV) are really 
the crux of this paper’s message. Exhibiting a strong 
negative correlation of r = -.5796 (see Figure 6), this 
suggested that the countries that more closely aligned 
their NSPs with Global Fund M&E indicators, 
witnessed larger HIV prevalence decreases than those 






Figure  7.  The  Change  in  Compliance  of  NSPs  With  Global  Fund  M&E  Indicators  From  pre‐2007  to 
post‐2007 and the Change in HIV Incidence From 2007 to 2009. Source: UNAIDS (2010). 
 
There are certainly many factors that cloud the 
pathway between policy change and HIV prevalence 
decline (civil society, international stakeholders, 
medical intervention, etc.), yet the significant 
correlation between the two may serve to destabilize 
certain conventional wisdoms about locally devised, 
culturally relevant policy making. If countries that 
design their policies more closely in line with global 
indicators experience larger declines in HIV 
prevalence, perhaps this contests the arguments that 
lambast “UN cookbooks” or “one-size-fits-all” 
policies. For instance, post-2008 Botswana has 
drastically shifted its NSP to move away from global 
indicators like free condom distribution and blood 
safety, toward more locally devised policies on 
alcohol abuse and prevention among HIV positive 
people. Since 2008, HIV prevalence in Botswana has 
increased by 0.9%. Conversely, post-2008 Namibia 
has sharply aligned its NSP with Global Fund M&E 
indicators. Since 2008, HIV prevalence in Namibia 
has decreased by 2.2%. Where Botswana represents 
the least compliant country with Global Fund M&E 
indicators, and Namibia the most, these relationships 
are intriguing.  
However, declining prevalence can mean a few 
different things. It certainly does not always indicate 
improved performance. It can mean prevention of new 
infections, but it can also mean that a lot of people are 
dead. For instance, countries like Botswana or Lesotho, 
may have experienced increases in prevalence rates as 
a result of more effective ARV treatment programs. A 
good way to examine what is actually going on is to 
also look at the relationship between policy change 
and HIV incidence (the number of new infections). 
UNAIDS is clear about the limitations around 
collecting incidence data, noting that actual incidence 
data does not really exist. Instead, they use youth 
(15-24) prevalence data of women attending antenatal 
clinics as a proxy measurement.  




are associated with larger Global Fund M&E indicator 
compliance, it seems that the opposite is true to HIV 
incidence (see Figure 7). The correlation coefficient 
here is r = .3168. This means that countries which 
comply less with global HIV policy, have experienced 
fewer new infections since 2008. While the negative 
correlation with HIV prevalence and the positive 
correlation with HIV incidence may appear to be 
contradictory at first glance, this may not be true. It 
may be, as stated above, that countries which comply 
less with Global Fund M&E indicators—or indeed, 
deviate—are proving themselves to be both better at 
preventing new interventions (declining incidence) 
and better at treatment and care programs (increasing 
prevalence, or smaller decreases in prevalence).  
Admittedly, the relationship between policy 
change and HIV prevalence and/or incidence change 
could potentially mean very different things. The 
important thing to consider is that there are changes 
happening: changes in policy, changes in HIV 
prevalence, and changes in HIV incidence. The 
correlations between these changes are a potentially 
invaluable testimony to policy efficacy and HIV 
governance in general. However, the logic behind any 
kind of causal link behind these variables deserves 
considerable scepticism.  
IMPLICATIONS: DOES POLICY MATTER? 
Even with the recognition that there is a new global 
political environment for HIV/AIDS, and that this 
climate has brought about certain changes in 
HIV/AIDS policy making in affected countries, it 
does not necessarily follow that these changes have 
any relevance for epidemiological outcomes. There is 
a body of evidence that permits the reasonable notion 
that HIV policies play a role in behavior change 
outcomes. Many have pointed to the “Zero Grazing” 
policies in Uganda as having a strong impact on 
behavioral results. Some also contended that these 
policies were what led directly to declining HIV 
incidence and prevalence rates in the country (Green 
et al. 2006). Other studies have demonstrated that 
voluntary testing and counselling policies directly 
affected behavioral outcomes, in which those, who 
discovered that they were HIV-positive, engaged in 
less risky sexual behavior than they did before they 
knew their status (Weinhardt et al. 1999). Condom use 
has also been shown to increase, especially among 
men who have sex with men, as a result of certain 
behavior change communication and social marketing 
policies (Wang, Gao, and Zhang 2005; Hearst and 
Chen 2004). Lastly, policy impact work has been done 
in countries where polices were implemented in some 
regions and not others, such that “control groups” 
existed. Here, too, it was found that epidemiological 
results—such as under-five mortality—fell more 
sharply in regions where the policy was implemented, 
versus those where it was not (Glick, Younger, and 
Sahn 2006).  
It is also not universally true that policies are 
always successful in exacting behavioral results. 
There is a host of other examples that illustrate 
examples like declining condom use after the 
implementation of behavior change communication 
policies (Wang 2008). This idea was articulated 
particularly well by President Robert Mugabe in the 
2006-2010 Zimbabwe National HIV Strategic Plan, 
where he said “While I acknowledge that knowledge 
levels in relation to HIV are now very high, it has to 
be noted that awareness does not necessarily translate 
to behaviour change”. He is right. The connection 
between policy and behavior is a tenuous one. That is 
to say, it is not altogether invaluable information if 
there is a notable correlation between shifts in policy 
and shifts in HIV prevalence. Some policies are surely 
more straightforwardly related to behavioral outcomes; 
needle exchange programs or routine circumcision are 
much easier to measure tangible results than policies 
that focus on de-stigmatization or gender 
mainstreaming. In addition, it is important to highlight 




prioritizes certain policies. For instance, the policy for 
MSM (men who have sex with men) populations is 
regarded as necessary from a human rights perspective, 
even if those populations are relatively small in terms 
of overall prevalence rates in Southern Africa. Taken 
together, the concept of policy environments or 
broader social and structural factors that affect policy 
making are increasingly argued to be partly 
responsible for declining (or increasing) HIV 
prevalence rates (Aids2031 2010). Thus, while direct 
causality between policy and prevalence rates is 
nearly impossible to prove, a correlation between the 
two may still reveal itself to be a useful tool in 
evaluating policy efficacy.  
Indeed, it may also be true that countries which are 
less compliant with Global Fund M&E indicators have 
made that decision because of their high prevalence 
rates and their disillusionment with internationally 
designed strategies. Alternatively, perhaps it is too 
soon to see the impacts from the more locally 
informed policies out of Botswana and South Africa. 
They may prove to be the most effective, 10 years 
down the road. Then again, does Zeitgeist follow 
policy or does policy encode Zeitgeist? Maybe written 
policies represent approaches that have been in 
practice for years preceding. The nature of UNAIDS 
prevalence statistics is also a point of uncertainty. 
These numbers are constantly adjusted and revised 
based on more advanced systems of estimation.  
It is also true that countries with more globally 
aligned policies are more heavily funded by global 
institutions and are therefore more motivated to 
present prevalence data that impresses their donors. 
The relationship shown here, between policy change 
and HIV prevalence decline, may illustrate any 
number of causal relationships. However, despite of 
the muddy nature of the causal relationship between 
HIV policy and HIV prevalence/incidence, one can 
still make robust inferences based on data and say 
something meaningful about its potential implications. 
This means that while this data cannot explicitly 
conclude that certain policies are more efficacious 
than others, it can still meaningfully suggest that the 
trends are worth considering. It is still a worthwhile 
exercise to think about what this could mean for 
efforts to combat the epidemic in Southern Africa. 
It is important to continue closely monitoring the 
connections between policy and epidemiological 
outcomes, over time, so that this political scaffolding 
may become a more fruitful analysis for policy 
efficacy. It may well be too soon to draw assertive 
conclusions about the policy changes that have begun 
to occur since 2008. Additionally, any association 
with outcomes in HIV prevalence and incidence must 
be part of a longitudinal study that traces these 
relationships over longer periods of time. This data 
here serves as a platform for this kind of policy 
monitoring. It also works as an incentive since it is 
evident that changes are occurring in the 
policy-making process, as well as in the 
epidemiological trends of HIV in Southern Africa.  
CONCLUSIONS 
It is clear that the new global politics of HIV/AIDS is 
beginning to have an effect on policy making in 
affected countries, with Botswana and South Africa 
being the first Southern African countries to adjust 
their NSPs away from Global Fund M&E rhetoric. 
Evidence from declining donor funding and shifting 
political emphasis on HIV/AIDS seems to have begun 
around 2008. However, the ramifications of this 
statement did not really begin to emerge in funding 
crises until 2010. Now, with the Global Fund 
cancelling Round 11 of its grants due to lack of funds 
from contributing countries, this initial donor retreat 
may only be the very beginning of a larger change. 
Therefore, the policy changes that are now emerging 
may also be the very first symptoms of a much larger 
movement away from Global Fund M&E indicators as 
policy benchmarks.  




suggest that compliance with Global Fund M&E 
indicators is correlated with larger drops in HIV 
prevalence, but also with larger drops in incidence. At 
this early stage in donor retreat and African policy 
change, perhaps the focus should be to gather a more 
complete picture of what HIV policy looks like, at the 
micro-level. There is a great need for a more detailed 
understanding of country-specific HIV/AIDS policy. 
Without this kind of rigorous policy mapping, 
measurements of policy efficacy will be conjecture, at 
best. The answer to this paper’s question—who 
governs?—must be central in any evaluation of policy 
change and epidemiological outcomes. If it turns out 
that the conceptions around domestic versus foreign or 
African versus Western policies are needed to be 
recalibrated, then the real political battle of HIV/AIDS 
has not even begun.  
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